Wrote this up a while back when stock was $102+. Could be interesting if it keeps drifting. Target is $120+ if they close the deal and do buybacks at current levels. End-game is that they get bought. CEO pretty studly. Crowded though and absolute upside not huge. Definitely a dance-while-music-is-playing stock.
Thesis
·
Currently at $4.4 Bn market cap, VC had been on
a simplification warpath over the last 4 years and delivered significant
shareholder value – and we are coming to the last leg of this story as it
reached a deal to divest its whole 70% stake in the climate business. Assuming deal
close in 2Q15, VC can return 60% of its market cap (70% if it takes in 1-turn
of leverage) quickly and should meaningfully shield any downside (as buyback
increasingly accretive as price drops). Currently the stubCo implies ~5x
EV/EBITDA (Peer @ 7-8x) while growing 8-9% top-line and rapidly approaching
peer margins with favorable secular trend and strong market position. The
ultimate sale of the remaining company is not out-of-question. $130 PT at 7x
FY16 #’s (30% up), $140-160 in a take-out scenario, downside muted without
deal-break due to buy-back accretion.
Business
Overview
·
Post
the transactions, Visteon will be a pure-play auto-electronics business, the #3
player in cockpit electronics (10% market share), #2 player in driver
information (22% market share) and #2 player in instrument clusters (19% market
share). Management has guided to total revenue of $3.8B by 2017 and 10% plus
EBITDA margins supported by a solid net new backlog of business ~ $500MM.
·
Sales
by product are comprised of Instrument Clusters and Displays (57% of sales),
Audio and Infotainment (27% of sales), Vehicle Electronics (10% of sales) and
Controls (6% of sales).
·
36%
EU, 29% NA, and 32% Asian Pacific.
·
34%
Ford, 14% Nissan/Renault, 9% Mazda, 6% BMW, 5% Honda, 5% GM and 27% Other.
Why
does this opportunity exist?
·
Deal risk remains on the table.
·
Event fatigue: VC had been a “crowded” event
name for 4 years & many refuse to look due to “missing it”
·
Complexity remains for traditional screen to
pick it up; noisiness in forward #’s won’t clear until deal close.
Developments
and Considerations
1.
Significant
capital return is in-sight and should meaningfully shield any downside.
·
On December 17th 2014, VC announced
that it will sell its 70% stake in Halla Visteon (or ~75% of VC’s prior EBTIDA
composition) to a consortium by Hahn & Co (a PE firm) and Hankook Tire Co.
Ltd. The transaction translates to a very nice ~10x multiple and should tax-efficiently
return ~$3.1 Bn of cash to VC upon closure. Deal is scheduled to close in 1H15.
·
Upon closure, VC will return ~$2.5-2.75 Bn of
cash to shareholders. This is ~60%
of VC’s current market cap.
·
If the buyback occurs at this level (~$100),
The pro-forma VC trades at 5.3x FY16 EBITDA. Assuming 7x, the stock should be
worth $130 / share post buy-back. While path-dependency is clearly important
(i.e. 7x will get us a lower target if buyback occurs at higher price), the
accretion math still works at until $115 / share.
2.
Execution
track-record & secular trend provides comfort to growth & margin targets.
·
VC is known to set a low bar then top it –
beating EBITDA guidance for the past 4 years and 14 out of 16 quarters. It has
also executed on all simplification promises since Tim Leuliette took the CEO
role in late 2010
·
Going forward, management had guided to 7-8%
top-line growth w/ EBITDA margin hitting 9%+ by 2010.
·
While seemingly ambitious, the cockpit /
interface market where VC competes offers a favorable secular trend: the
dashboard / cockpit design and interface offers a point of differentiation
amongst many OEMs while vehicle-based specs approach homogeneity. There is a
clear trend towards digitalization (have you noticed the much cooler dashboards
in new car?) and increasing demand for infotainment functionality, and this
trend can easily drives 3-4% growth via content ASP/car + 2-3 % growth in
broader penetration / share gain for years to come. It is estimated that
cockpit electronics market will exceed $50 Bn w/ a 10% CAGR by 2020.
·
This all compares to underlying vehicle growth
estimated for this period at ~1.5-2% per annum.
·
Bottom-line is, as a strong #3, there is no
reason why VC cannot achieve peer-level 9-10% EBITDA margin – and the
trajectory is clear w/ a visible secular tailwind + synergies from recent YFV
& JCI acquisitions.
·
I think a decent comp with somewhat similar
growth would be HAR which trades at 9-10x forward EBITDA.
3.
While
currently not spoken of, strategic interest for VC stub could surface.
·
The next leg after closing the HVCC deal,
getting interior divestitures behind, and integrating the 3 electronics pieces
may be potential talks on a PE/strategic buy-out should valuation remain muted.
·
Post a sizable capital return problem, VC will
stand at ~$1.8-2.2 Bn market cap w/ little debt. A very palatable size for any
buyers looking to enter into this fast growth, low CapEx niche.
·
CEO himself will net a ~$40 mm package upon CoC
termination (w/ $32 mm being accelerated vesting). While he extended his
contract to 2017, I view this 3 year window a perfect opportunity to pamper VC
up for sale w/ cleaned up EBITDA at the peak of the cycle (esp. w/ leverage
amongst peers at record low since 2000), and marking the most rational full
stop to a very successful turnaround.
Risk
/ Mitigations
·
Deal
Risk: closing should be quick (3-5 months) but is still subject
to market conditions clearly. I do believe the deal is well-shopped for a year
and Hahn as a Korean firm is the most logical buyer w/ a strategic.
·
Macro: Weak
auto demand, Asian and European recession, currency, raw material cost
increases.
·
Potential
transformative acquisitions: Mgmt had guided to
shareholder return 1st and foremost and see no big acquisitions down
the road, but this could change 1 year out.
·
Path
dependency: The best scenario for VC is if it stays at
$95-$100 until buyback is complete – the accretion there will be materially
accretive; however, if VC rallies to $115+ pre-deal-close, the then-commenced
buyback will be less accretive and will result in lower PT.
Event
Path / Catalysts
·
Feb 23, 2015: 4Q14 earning
·
April 30 – June 30, 2015: HVCC Deal Close.
·
April - May 2015: Update on Capital Allocation
Plans post deal close.
·
June 2015 – June 2016: Capital Return
commencing.
2 comments:
Thanks for the post. Downside certainly seems limited here assuming HVCC closes. Arent they more likely to do a return of capital special dividend than try to buy back an enormous percentage of stock? Creates high percentage upside to stub but less gross dollars of upside. Would also better highlight the multiple of electronics
Anon,
I think they are leaning towards the dividend yes, but the posturing suggest to me that they are willing to do a massive tender as well -- thus the ambiguity around the shareholder returns plan.
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